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The Lockheed Aircraft Corporation emerged from World War
II a financially sound organization enjoying a reputation as
one of the leading U. S. manufacturers of military and civil-
ian aircraft. However, by 1971 Lockheed had amassed debts
of over $700 million and claimed it would be forced into
bankruptcy unless federal loan guarantees were granted to its
creditors.
This paper consists of three independent case studies
intended for use in the Management curriculum at the Naval
Postgraduate School. The cases lend themselves to utiliza-
tion in courses devoted to general management but have
generally financial overtones.
Information for writing the cases was obtained from
periodicals in the public domain which were published during
the period relevant to each case. For this reason, some of
the financial figures may be in error in the light of
information published at a later date. No attempt was made
by the author to reconcile any such errors in financial
data. Rather, the estimates made of losses, costs and
profits are those which were published in the public domain
at the time of the case.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In May 1971, legislation which came to be known as the
Emergency Loan Guarantee Act was introduced before Congress.
Although the avowed purpose of this legislation was to pro-
vide federal guarantees for loans to major U. S. corpora-
tions experiencing serious financial difficulties, it was
widely believed to be specifically directed toward the
financial rescue of the nation's number one defense contrac-
tor, Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, from the brink of bank-
ruptcy. Published information on the operations of Lockheed
over the two preceding decades provides an abundance of
material through which the decline of this industrial giant
from industry leader in the early 1950s to near bankruptcy
in the 1970s may be traced.
This paper consists of three case studies which provide
information for the analysis of Lockheed management person-
nel and some specific decisions made by Lockheed management
during the 1950s and 1960s. The cases are not, nor were
they intended to be, purely financial in nature. Rather,
the cases lend themselves to analysis by anyone interested
in management and the difficulty of making decisions which
may well affect the lives and fortunes of literally thou-
sands of people. The cases are a direct result of interest
by Professor Leslie Darbyshire, who requested student
assistance in the preparation of case materials which could

be utilized in the various phases of the Management curricu-
lum at the Naval Postgraduate School.
Having chosen Lockheed Aircraft Corporation as his sub-
ject, Professor Darbyshire spent several months of his time
devoted to library research of information in the public
domain. He compiled as much data as possible, from as many
sources as were available, on the operations of Lockheed
since 1957. In December 1973, the author accepted Professor
Darbyshire ' s offer to sponsor development of the Lockheed
cases as a thesis project along with two other students.
Additional library research was conducted to augment that
already completed by Professor Darbyshire.
All information contained in the cases was obtained from
readily available periodicals in the public domain. No con-
clusions on their informational authenticity have been made
by the author. Specific references to footnotes have been
eliminated to facilitate classroom use of the cases.

II. DECISION AT LOCKHEED
(Case #1
)
During the first two quarters of calendar year 1960, the
Lockheed Aircraft Corporation and its corporate head,
Mr. Robert E. Gross, were faced with an unexpected - and
substantial - financial problem. Various alternatives for
its solution were under consideration. At first estimate,
the company stood to lose $24.5 million on its turboprop
powered commercial aircraft, the Electra. This aircraft had
recently been involved in two major crashes resulting in the
loss of 97 lives. Preliminary investigation into the cause
of these accidents revealed that structural failure of the
aircraft's wings was involved. The 13 commercial airlines
operating 136 Electra aircraft were justifiably concerned
about the safety of Lockheed's product and the advisability
of continued future operation of the large passenger plane.
Additionally, public confidence in the Electra as a desired
mode of travel appeared to be waning, with a resultant loss
of passengers and revenue to the airlines.
Following in-depth testing and evaluation by Lockheed
engineers, the probable cause of the fatal structural
failures of Electra wings was determined. Pending concur-
rence with the Lockheed findings by the Federal Aviation
Administration, the company was prepared to make structural
modifications to all Electra aircraft at an estimated cost
8

to the company of $12 million-. During the period of investi-
gation by Lockheed, the Federal Aviation Administration had
placed speed restrictions upon the aircraft which were con-
tinuing in service with the airlines. (See Exhibit 3 for
breakdown of Electra losses.)
To add to the financial troubles caused by the Electra,
cutbacks in spending by the Department of Defense promised to
heap another $43 million in losses upon the company. These
losses could be traced principally to the small executive
transport program - the CL-329 JetStar. The history of the
JetStar began in 1 956 when the Air Materiel Command of the
U. S. Air Force issued a design proposal for an 8-10 passen-
ger turbojet transport to be developed at industry expense.
The proposal was issued to 28 companies but only eight com-
panies were seriously in contention for approval of their
design. Lockheed, as one of the eight contenders, was the
first to produce a flyable prototype. The first flight of a
JetStar occurred in September 1957, just 241 days following
design finalization. Phase Two testing by the Air Force
commenced in February 1958, with JetStar production underway
at Lockheed's Marietta, Georgia, plant the following Novem-
ber. In October 1959, Lockheed was officially announced as
the winner of the development competition and five aircraft
were ordered by the Air Force in June 1960. These initial
five aircraft were to be utilized in the flight checking
and verification of aids to navigation within the Air Traf-
fic Control System. At the time of its initial interest in
the program, the USAF proposed to purchase an estimated 300
9

JetStars. However, informal estimates of the number of
aircraft to be sold to the Air Force ranged as high as 1000
to 1500. Three hundred JetStars constituted the estimated
break-even point for Lockheed, and additional sales within
the general aviation and corporate business markets were
expected to provide the company with a substantial profit
on the program.
However, the anticipated sales of JetStars to the Air
Force did not materialize; and increased competition from
other producers of executive transport aircraft reduced
Lockheed's potential share of the commercial market. By-
fiscal year 1963, Congress had authorized the expenditure
of $55.2 million by the Air Force for JetStars; but the
service had obligated only $30.8 million for the acquisition
of 16 aircraft. Congressional pressure against the acquisi-
tion of plush executive aircraft to transport military brass
was certainly a factor in the reduction of the number of
aircraft purchased.
As a result of the aforementioned reversals, investor
confidence in Lockheed slipped and was reflected on Wall
Street by a plunge in the price of Lockheed common stock
from a high of 32-7/8 to a low of 18-7/8 with continued
decline forecast. However, in the opinion of Mr. Gross, not
everything at Lockheed was gloomy. As evidence of brighter
days ahead, he offered news of several promising develop-
ments in other Lockheed programs whose profits, when
realized, should more than offset the losses and restore the
10

company to financial health. .
The Lockheed-produced Polaris Ballistic Missile recently
had demonstrated its reliability during a successful test
firing from a submerged submarine at the Atlantic Missile
Range. In addition to the sales of this system to the United
States, there existed considerable discussion of, and support
for, the inclusion of Polaris in the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) arsenal. If this plan was adopted, the
increased market for Polaris Missiles and associated hardware
would certainly add to corporate profits and somewhat offset
the losses currently envisioned in connection with the Elec-
tra and JetStar programs. In addition to Polaris, Lockheed
was actively involved in the burgeoning "race for space,"
being the prime contractor for the Midas Orbital Satellite
and a major subcontractor on the Samos Global Surveillance
System project. To add to these projects, Lockheed was
engaged in important research and development efforts to
produce a nuclear engine for use in future aircraft and
space vehicles.
On the more tangible side, Lockheed had existing con-
tracts with U. S. allies in amounts totalling $2.3 billion
i
over the succeeding five years for production of the Lock-
heed tactical fighter aircraft, the F-104 StarFighter. Of
the $2.3 billion in expected sales' revenue from the Star-




The immediate problem facing Mr. Gross and Lockheed con-
cerned the losses expected to accrue during the present and
succeeding years and certain costs which had been deferred
during previous years. At the heart of the problem was a
decision on how to account for these items in the financial
records of the company. The losses and costs on the Electra
and JetStar programs have been discussed above. In addition
to these, Lockheed faced considerable losses and costs from
several other programs.
The supersonic transport program had ceased to exist
after being dealt a mortal blow in Congress. According to
Lockheed, $1.2 million in research and development costs for
the SST were still being deferred and being carried as an
asset. Since the program on which these costs were incurred
was no longer in existence, these costs had to be written
off. Likewise, the stretched version of the C-130 Hercules
(the Super Hercules) had ceased to be a promising venture.
In the case of this program, $788,000 expended in research
and development was to be written off. Loss in the market
value of 21 used aircraft either in the Lockheed inventory
or contracted for required an inventory write down of $3.1
million. The disallowance of costs on .-veral government
contracts, refunds required by the renegotiation of con-
tracts, and income tax liabilities totalled $6.9 million.
The total amount being considered for write offs, write
downs and adjustments came to $150 million before taxes.
(The after-tax bill was approximately $67.5 million.)
12

In the opinion of Lockheed management, there existed two
alternatives. In the words of one source:
"Gross could minimize the losses by the usual method
of spreading them over several years, or he could
do what plane manufacturers had rarely done - write
them all off at once".
It was felt by many analysts that to make a huge write off in
a single operating year would unnecessarily jeopardize inves-
tor confidence in the firm. When asked by analysts whether
Lockheed accounting would be approved by the Internal Revenue
Service for tax purposes (Lockheed planned to write off in
1 960 some of the Electra modification costs which would be
incurred in 1961), Mr. Gross replied:
"This, of course, is a great hazard. We relied on
the advice of our tax counsel, who has been with
us for 20 years, and our external auditors. We
have an opinion from each - strangely enough in
^
conformity - that they feel it will be accepted."
The regulations governing federal tax write offs allow a
corporation to charge development and modification costs and
losses in the market value of the company's products against
current expenses. If, as a result of this action, the firm
experiences a net operating loss for the year, it can claim
its loss of profits from the government in the form of a cash
refund of its three previous years federal income taxer-
starting with the third previous year, then to the second and
finally to the last year. If this is not sufficient to cover
its losses, the company may elect to offset future earnings






If Lockheed chooses to write off the costs incurred
for research and development, should all such costs, both
past and present, be written off at the same time?
2. Should Lockheed write off its losses for financial
reporting purposes only; for tax purposes only; or for both
purposes?
3. Should Lockheed continue to defer research and
development costs as a corporate policy or should the firm
adopt the policy of expensing research and development costs
as they occur?
4. What are the possible ramifications, both internal
and external to Lockheed, of the course (s) of action you






As of December 1
($ Million)
1939 1958 1957
Net Sales 1301 .6 962.7 868.3
Cost of Sales 1 1 83 . 6 830.3 735.1
R&D Costs 15.1 17.9 25.6
Retirement Plan Expense 12.9 10.6 10.5
Administration 60.6 51 .8 51 .4
Depreciation 13.1 12.1 10.7
Net Earnings 16.3 39.7 34.8
Other Income 6.4 3.4 3.3
Total Income (BT) 22.7 43.1 38.1
Interest Expense 5.3 5.1 4.7
Tax 8.7 19.5 17.1






As of December 31
($ Million)
ASSETS 1959 1958 1957
Cash 36.9 38.0 34.8
Receivables 181 .6 118.5 89.1
Inventory 171 .9 249.9 200.4
Advances 1.9 4.2 10.0
Prepaid Expenses 11 .7 12.7 10.0
Investments 6.5 6.4 5.5
Notes Receivable 4.7
Net Plant & Equipment 72.6 63.7 61 .1
Deferred R&D Costs 31 .4 13.5 6.3
Other Deferred Costs 2.0 1 .2 1.7
Total Assets 521 .2 508.1 418.9
LIABILITIES
Notes Payable 75.0 80.0 25.0
Accounts Payable 114.1 89.1 68.6
Taxes Payable 7.9 15.5 12.8
Accrued Liabilities 24.0 19.2 16.3
Other Liabilities 40.3 34.8 28.0
Advances 67.2 79.8 87.2
Debentures 41 .8 48.3 58.1
Deferred Income 4.0 5.1 6.9
Capital Stock 7.2 3.1 2.9
Paid-in Surplus 47.3 41 .7 32.3
Retained Earnings 92.4 91 .5 80.8




EXPECTED LOSS BREAKDOWN 4/
(After Taxes)
ELECTRA PROGRAM :
Modification of in-service aircraft $ 11,441,000
Modification of production aircraft 11,774,000
Investigation of failure 1 ,241 ,000
JETSTAR PROGRAM:
$ 24,456,000
R&D and inventory write down 31,153,000
SUPERSONIC TRANSPORT PROGRAM :
R&D 1 ,214,000
SUPER HERCULES PROGRAM :
R&D 788,000
USED AIRCRAFT :
Resale value write down 3,091,000
OTHER :
Contract cost disallowances )
Re-negotiation refunds ) 6,867,000
Income tax liabilities )
TOTAL EXPECTED LOSS (After Taxes) S 67,569,000
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III. MANAGEMENT IN THE 1960s -
CHALLENGE TO LOCKHEED AIRCRAFT CORPORATION
(Case #2)
Following a bravely executed write off of enormous losses
in 1960, the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation began a new drive
for corporate profits. With the death of Chairman Robert E.
Gross in September 1961, leadership of the giant corporation
fell to Courtlandt S. Gross, the late Chairman's younger
brother. This shift in leadership also involved a change in
managerial philosophy and style.
While Robert Gross was known to enjoy a rather flamboyant
style of living which included fast sport cars, extravagant
parties and modern art, his younger brother, Court, was of a
different mold. The younger Gross preferred to drive a
Volkswagen, entertained only modestly and wore a homburg.
As a manager, Court Gross believed in a participatory
style with members of top management working as a team to
achieve the decision-making process within the corporate
structure. In sharp contrast to the elder Mr. Gross, the new'
Chairman of Lockheed believed in granting to subordinates
the authority necessary to conduct their corporate affairs
in an effective manner. Closer scrutiny of nuts-and-bolts
costs was also another trait of the younger Mr. Gross.
Due to the contrasting leadership and managerial styles
of the two men and the possible effects the change in top
management might have upon the corporation, more than a few
18

individuals wondered whether Courtlandt Gross was up to the
tasks which lay before him as the Chairman of Lockheed Air-
craft Corporation. However, as if to allay any fears and
doubts of his abilities, Mr. Gross announced in March 1962
that Lockheed had bounced back from the huge losses of 1960.
He reported record profits of $26 million on record sales of
$1.44 billion during 1961.
In what might have been considered an unwise or even
heretical move by others of the aerospace industry, Lockheed
decided to change the character of its product mix. The
corporation chose to concentrate upon defense production
rather than the more cyclical commercial aircraft market.
This decision was. made at a point in time when most defense
contractors were searching for product lines which would
reduce their dependency upon defense contracts for corporate
profits.
Lockheed manned aircraft contracts, as well as its con-
tributions to space exploration, were substantial. Seventy-
five per cent of the total payload orbited by the United
States had roared away from the launching pad aboard Lock-
heed-produced boosters. In 1961 alone, the Polaris Ballis-
tic Missile program had brought the company $373 million in
sales. During the same period, the P2V Neptune Antisubma-
rine Warfare Aircraft, the C-130 Hercules Transport and the




Future prospects were also bright due to the new emphasis
by the Department of Defense upon the mobility of combat
forces and the attendant requirement for rapid-response air-
lift capability. In March 1961 Lockheed was named the winner
of a contract competition to produce the airlift capability
and capacity of the future - the 158 ton, 550 m.p.h. Lockheed
C— 1 4 1 StarLifter. It was estimated that this contract award
would be worth $1 billion in revenues to Lockheed during the
1960s.
In the eyes of other defense contractors, Mr. Gross and
Lockheed were courting financial disaster by placing nearly
three quarters of their eggs in the defense basket. However,
Chairman Gross countered by arguing that defense was substan-
tially less risky than commercial business. At the root of
this belief was Mr. Gross's opinion that the risk of product
development was appreciably reduced in the defense sector by
the financial support of research and development by govern-
ment contract. It was also suggested that certain technolo-
gy spinoffs from federally-funded projects would occur and
these would have application to products for the civilian
market. Since the research and development costs for such
knowledge would have been paid for by other than Lockheed,
Mr. Gross opined that the company would save on such costs
for its commercial ventures.
In an industry beset with uncertainties and huge finan-
cial risks, Lockheed enjoyed a reputation of being an inno-
vative and imaginative company. Its contributions to
20

aviation and aerospace technology were a source of intense
pride to Lockheed employees. This pride in past accomplish-
ments and future prospects at times produced a heady euphoria
which occasionally might mask other corporate facts of life.
Lockheed had produced such exotic products as the U-2 spy
plane, the A— 1 1 Interceptor with a speed of over 2,000 m.p.h.
and the supersecret replacement for the U-2, the SR-71
.
These projects had all emerged from Lockheed's renowned
"Skunk Works" under the creative genius of Clarence "Kelly"
Johnson. In addition to being famous for imaginative creati-
vity, Lockheed was also known as a company which could readily
make the product go from "think tank," to drawing board, to
production. Thus, in 1964 a new idea came forth. Prelimi-
nary plans envisioned a rocket plane capable of carrying ten
passengers and a crew of two between earth and an orbital
space station. This "space shuttle" was to be operational
by 1975. To back its claim of feasibility, Lockheed pro-
jected a round-trip "fare" of $11,700 per passenger and
planned to use each vehicle for 500 round trips.
Buoyed by success in the aerospace and aircraft indus-
tries Mr. Gross set the company upon a course of diversifi-
cation. Company engineers began building a $12 million
dam in V/yoming, developed monorail mass transit systems and
designed shipping containers which could be used in all
modes of transport interchangeably. Additionally, Lockheed,
one of the cornerstones of the aircraft industry, went to
sea. The company began work on a 300-ton hydrofoil ship for
21

the Navy, an undersea exploration vessel and an emergency
flotation system for the raising of sunken submarines. By
making engineering changes and utilizing affective salesman-
ship, the company had even been able to turn one of its
biggest losers - the Electra - into a profit. Sales to the
Navy of a re-designed and modified Electra (dubbed the P-3A
Orion) would bring Lockheed, at first estimates, sales of
$100 million per year with continued sales of follow-on
models assured.
In the area of labor relations, Courtlandt Gross was a
man of strong principles. Faced with heavy pressure from the
International Association of Machinists for a "union shop",
Lockheed experienced costly strikes on four separate occa-
sions rather than require union membership of its employees.
Mr. Gross contended that each employee should be free to join
the union if he so desired but by no means should an indivi-
dual be forced into membership as a condition of employment.
During early December 1962, Lockheed suffered a strike
which, for 36 hours, brought company operations from Florida
to Hawaii to a virtual standstill. Earlier in the same
year, a presidential committee had recommended that the dif-
ficult issue of unionism be settled by a vote of the employ-
ees in each aerospace company. Although confident that
Lockheed workers would cast their ballots against the insti-
tution of a "union shop," Mr. Gross was adamant in his
opposition to such a vote. Mr. Gross's response to the
committee's recommendation was simply that a person's right
22

to work was not something to be voted away. Gross's rejec-
tion of the committee's proposal brought official displeasure
from the White House. President John F. Kennedy made no
attempt to mask his displeasure with Courtlandt Gross's posi-
tion and attitude. Informal pressures were applied in the
form of thinly-veiled threats that such a recalcitrant atti-
tude might affect existing and future government contracts
for Lockheed. Courtlandt Gross stood his ground!
When the inevitable strike occurred at Lockheed in Decem-
ber 1962, the Administration was forced to alter its stand.
A long labor shutdown at Lockheed (producer of vital defense
systems such as the Polaris Ballistic Missile System and
others) simply could not be tolerated. Consequently,
President Kennedy was forced to invoke the provisions of the
Taft-Hartley Law to keep the production lines at Lockheed
humming. Under the provisions of the Taft-Hartley Law, an
eighty-day "cooling off" period was provided for further
negotiations between labor and management. In the face of
such opposition the International Association of Machinists
terminated the strike. Thus it appeared that Mr. Courtlandt
Gross, in being true to his convictions, had won a battle
over fundamental rights for the workers at Lockheed and had
possibly set a precedent for labor relations within the
aerospace industry. As if to validate Mr. Gross's stand,
Lockheed workers eventually voted 85% in favor of a new
contract which excluded any provisions for a "union shop."
23

Within Lockheed, over the course of several years, a
change in managerial style and philosophy had taken place.
With the death of Robert Gross the autocratic, Theory X style
of management had apparently been replaced with the more
participatory, Theory T style of Courtlandt Gross. Does the
decline during the latter 1960s and early 1970s of Lockheed
indicate a failure of participatory management? Could Lock-
heed management have foreseen the problems which forced the
company to the ragged edge of bankruptcy? Was Lockheed sim-
ply a victim of circumstances or could the management team






In August 1956, the Air Materiel Command (AMC) of the
United States Air Force made a proposal to the aircraft in-
dustry for an industry-developed, small, high-speed transport.
In its proposal, the Air Force expressed a willingness to
forgo any specific military requirements in the aircraft.
This was done in order to allow the companies a wide latitude
in design in competing for sales of the aircraft to the Air
Force. Such flexibility might make the plane readily market-
able as a civilian executive craft and would certainly ease
difficulties often encountered in the certification of mili-
tary aircraft for civilian use. Travel time by executives,
both military and civilian, was becoming increasingly impor-
tant, and the time was right for a new generation of execu-
tive aircraft. This need was expressed on the military side
by the Executive Director of the Air Force Association who
said:
"The other day, a good friend of mine - a major
general in the Air Force - had business across
the country from his station in Washington. His
flight schedule called for a 20-hour elapsed time
to destination. If an executive's time is worth
thousands of dollars an hour - then we taxpayers
have a reason to question his multi-thousand-
dollar hike from coast to coast. His aircraft
was that wonderful old clunker known to the mili-
tary as a C-47...I have noted that the C-47, or
DC-3, is a mainstay of the business fleet."
On the civilian side, the Office of Planning, Research and
Development of the Civil Aeronautics Administration forecast:
25

"Business and utility manufacturers have entered a
golden decade that will see their sales more than
triple to about $240 million annually in 1965."
A. IN THE BEGINNING...
Armed with knowledge that a specific requirement for the
small, high-speed, executive transport existed and confident
in its ability to produce such an aircraft, Lockheed entered
the competition. From the drawing boards emerged a design
labeled the L-329 which appeared to fill the bill. The L-329
was designed as a "ten (or more) place, swept-wing passenger
plane" to be powered by four General Electric J-85 engines.
The design called for an aircraft which would have a range
of 2,000 miles and a speed of 525 m.p.h. (See Exhibit 1 for
JetStar specifications.)
In touting its entry into the executive jet market,
Lockheed was not at all modest. Mr. Hall L. Hibbard, Senior
Vice President of Lockheed, said:
"Actually, in passenger and crew comfort, and
in aircraft performance, the L-529 compares
with the large jet transports - at a fraction
of the cost."
After engineers in Burbank, California and Marietta, Georgia,
had decided upon the final configuration of the L-329, the
project was turned over to Mr. C. L. "Kelly" Johnson who
personally supervised the building of prototypes. ("Kelly"
Johnson was the creative genius behind Lockheed's renowned
"Skunk Works," which produced many of Lockheed's most exotic
aircraft.) This work commenced in February 1957, with the
first flight scheduled for September of the same year. In
26

the words of Mr. Hibbard , "...there never was any question
of making it."
Mr. Hibbard 's confidence was certainly justified as the
new aircraft moved from preliminary drawings to flight in a
mere 241 days. The Lockheed entry was the first to fly, and
it appeared that Lockheed's chances of winning a lucrative
production contract were, indeed, excellent. (See Exhibit 2
for JetStar timetable.) Of the twenty-eight companies which
received the Air Materiel Command's proposal in August 1956,
eight firms were known to be seriously at work on the project.
These eight firms were: Lockheed; North American; Fairchild;
Beech; Cessna; Temco; McDonnell; and Northrup. At the time
of the original Air Force proposal the Air Materiel Command
had stated that an approximate requirement for 1000 - 1500
twin-jet aircraft and 200 - 300 four-jet aircraft over a
procurement period of five to seven years was envisioned.
If Lockheed could capture this contract, as well as a size-
able share of the expected civilian market, the L-329 would
certainly be a profitable venture.
Even though Lockheed's entry (now officially known as
the CL-329 JetStar) was the first "new" aircraft to fly,
there existed several alternative aircraft to be considered
by the Air Force. North American's twin- jet Sabreliner was
scheduled to fly in March 1958. The Sabreliner design was
for four passengers plus a crew of two with a high density
seating option which increased the passenger load to nine.
Fairchild, with its four-engined model, the M-185F, had
27

already sold aircraft to Continental Can Company and Conti-
nental Oil Company with expected delivery in 1960. The Beech
Aircraft Company offered an aircraft which was available
immediately. The company had an option to build, under
license, the French-made Morane Saulnier MS-760 at its Wichi-
ta plant. The only factor holding up production was an ab-
sence of orders to make production worthwhile. Cessna, long
a producer of aircraft for the general aviation market, was
developing a four-seat version of its T-37A primary jet
training aircraft. This aircraft, already in use in large
numbers by the Air Force in the training of student pilots,
offered the service the advantages of commonality. If the
Cessna entry could satisfy the mission requirements of the
Air Materiel Command as an executive transport and mission
support aircraft, logistic support of the aircraft would
certainly be less costly due to commonality with the T-37A.
The other firms working on entries were in various stages of
development but were generally well behind Lockheed, North
American, Fairchild, Beech and Cessna.
In addition to the expected sales to the Air Force,
interest existed within the Navy for an aircraft which would
perform the same functions as the Air Force model. "Kelly"
Johnson of Lockheed was confident the JetStar could "easily"
be modified to withstand the rigors of launch and recovery
aboard an aircraft carrier.
In January 1959, Lockheed decided to market the JetStar
in only the four-jet configuration. This decision was
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apparently motivated by the rather poor performance of the
twin-jet version when operating on a single engine at high
gross weights. Other than this decision on engine configura-
tion, the JetStar appeared to. meet satisfactorily all re-
quirements of the Air Force, both for utility and performance.
Indeed, the aircraft had successfully demonstrated in the
twin- jet configuration its adaptability to a number of var-
ious missions. The decision to market the four- jet version
only enhanced the reliability and performance specifications
of the JetStar. In addition to the JetStar 's anticipated
role of VIP transport, the aircraft could be utilized as a
flying classroom for navigators and bombardiers, as a tow
for gunnery targets, as a reconnaissance and electronic
warfare platform and as a small cargo aircraft.
Lockheed was named the winner of the competition by the
Air Force in October 1959> and five aircraft were ordered in
June 1960. The first of these five JetStars was delivered
in April 1961, and Lockheed's hopes were high that continued
deliveries would be made on schedule. It certainly appeared
that Lockheed's early hopes for the JetStar were beginning
to materialize.
B. REALITY COMES HOME TO ROOST
In January 1962, it was reported that Lockheed faced a
possible $80 million before-tax loss on the JetStar. Lock-
heed had spent about $100 million developing the aircraft
and needed to sell at least 300 to break even on the pro-
gram. As of the beginning of 1962 a total of 43 aircraft
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had been sold to all customers. At the time, total orders
from the Air Force were 16, and Lockheed expected to halt
production later in 1962 unless new orders were forthcoming.
Of the $80 million loss estimated by Lockheed, $65 million
had been written off and $10 million had been consumed in
administrative costs. It was hoped that the remaining $5
million could be recovered by future sales of the JetStar.
The JetStars ordered by the Air Force were all to be
assigned to the 1 254th Air Transport Wing at Andrews Air
Force Base near Washington, D.C. Of the sixteen, five were
to be utilized for flight-checking aids to navigation, five,
having convertible interiors, were to be used for mission
support, and the remaining six were to be assigned the VIP
transport role. Congressional records show that through
1962 the Air Force had been authorized funds to buy approxi-
mately 30 to 35 JetStars. (See Exhibit 3 for funding and
expenditure breakdown.)
According to Lockheed Chairman, Robert Gross, who had
died in 1961, the failure of the Air Force to buy JetStars
in the number originally anticipated was due to several fac-
tors. The emphasis placed upon missiles and space projects
by the Eisenhower Administration plus the de-emphasis of
manned aircraft during the period both drained funds away
from the JetStar. In addition, funds which were available
for the procurement of manned aircraft were being appro-
priated for tactical rather than mission-support aircraft.
The market for civilian executive transports, or at least
iO

Lockheed's share of that market, failed to meet Lockheed's
forecasts. This placed the attainment of the break-even
point on the JetStar even further from Lockheed's grasp.
In a further attempt to sell the JetStar, Lockheed sought
to interest purchasers of the F-104 StarFighter in the air-
craft. Lockheed contended that the JetStar, equipped as a
flying classroom, could be utilized in the training of F-104
pilots. The F-104 aircraft, with its highly sophisticated
radar and weapons-delivery systems, was a difficult aircraft,
at best, in which to become proficient. By utilizing the
JetStar to train pilots in the use of these sophisticated
sub-systems, training time and funds could be saved due to
the multiplace configuration of the JetStar. In this way,
several pilots could be trained simultaneously with the
added advantage of an on-site instructor. Several JetStars
were sold to Allied operators of the F-104. However, the
total number of such sales was insignificant in relation to
the number required for Lockheed to attain the break-even
point
.
C. OPTIMISM SPRINGS ETERNAL
Robert I. Mitchell, who was assigned to JetStar sales on
a full time basis, hung on to the belief that the Air Force
still needed about 300 JetStars for mission support require-
ments. According to Lockheed, the Air Force was being
offered an aircraft which they could hardly refuse since the
JetStar justified itself on cost savings alone. Lockheed
stated that the JetStar, when used in the mission-support
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role at an operating cost of 420 per nautical mile, was more
economical than aircraft currently being used to support the
many missions of the service. The company stated that the
cost of operating a JetStar was 26$ less than a Douglas C-47,
29$ less than a Convair C— 131 and 47$ less than a Douglas
C-54. (See Exhibit 4 for operating costs of the JetStar.)
According to Lockheed beliefs, the failure of the
civilian market to materialize was due to a lessening of
corporate desire to purchase aircraft solely for prestige
purposes. However, the company felt that once enough Jet-
Stars were in service, discussion of the aircraft's capabi-
lities by professional pilots would cause the plane to start
selling itself on reputation. It was also felt by Lockheed
that corporate chief pilots would be reluctant to vote
against the acquisition of swift corporate jets. At the
root of this belief was Lockheed's opinion that such a nega-
tive vote by chief pilots would lead to increased use by
corporate executives of regularly scheduled airlines. This,
in turn, would decrease the requirement for corporate pilots.
It was Lockheed's conviction that corporate pilots were not
about to vote themselves out of a job. As a result, Lock-







What factors other than those discussed in the case
material, both within Lockheed and external to the company,
might have contributed to the downfall of the JetStar?
2. How might Lockheed have avoided the large financial
loss which it incurred?
3. Was Lockheed management to blame or was the company







Wing Area 532 sq. ft.
Wing Span 53' 8"
Length 58 ' 1 0"
Height 10' 6"
Fuselage diameter (outside) 85"




Max. density seating 22
Max . litter capacity 12
Takeoff gross weight 28,872 lb.
Fuel weight 10, 894 lb
.
Range 1,550 N.M.
Max. cruise altitude 45,000 ft.
Cruise Mach 77
Takeoff field length 3 , 760 ft
Landing speed 88 Kt















Air Force issued requirement for jet utility
transport (UCX) with 8-10 passenger capa-
bility to be developed at industry's expense,
Building of prototype started at Lockheed's
California Division in Burbank.
JetStar (powered by twin Bristol Orpheus
Turbojets) made 35 min. first flight at
Edwards Air Force Base, California.
Phase 2 testing completed by Air Force.
Production of standard aircraft started at
Lockheed-Georgia Co. in Marietta.
Pratt & Whitney JT12A Turbojet selected to
power JetStar; decision made to market
aircraft only in four-engine configuration.
Air Force named JetStar winner of UCX
competition.
Air Force ordered first five JetStars to
check navigation aids in ATC system.
First Air Force JetStar delivered by
Lockheed.
Federal Aviation Agency issued 4B Transport
Category-Type Certificate to JetStar and






AIR FORCE EXPENDITURE BREAKDOWN 5/
($ millions)
FISCAL YEAR REQUESTED APPROPRIATED OBLIGATED
1959 21 .8 21 .8 8.8
1960 23.4 23.4 0.0
1961 0.0 0.0 12.0





JETSTAR DIRECT OPERATING COSTS -
DOLLARS PER FLYING HOUR
ANNUAL UTILIZATION-HOURS
ITEM BASIS 400 600 800
FIXED COSTS:
Crew Salary $32,000 annual to-
tal for pilot &
co-pilot plus
22.5$ for fringe
benefits $ 98.00 65.30 49.00
Insurance 1 .75$ for hull &
public liability
• based on purchase
price of
$1,700,000 72.50 48.30 36.25
TOTAL FIXED COSTS
(without depreciation) $170.50 113.60 85.25
VARIABLE COSTS:
Fuel $0.30/gal,
1200 S.M. 132.00 132.00 132.00
Oil $12.00/gal,




hr; $4.50/labor hr 22.50 22.50 22.50
Airframe & En-
gine Maintenance
Material 21.25 21.25 21.25
Reserve for En-
gine Overhaul $12,400 per engine
per overhaul; 1 400
hrs between over-
hauls 35.40 55.40 55.4
TOTAL VARIABLE COSTS $211.46 211.46 211.46
TOTAL OPERATING COSTS $381.96 325.06 296.71
ACTUAL COST TO CORPORATION
(48$ Tax Bracket) $198.62 169.03 154.29
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